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Abstract
We consider the performance of the foremost academic
House of Representatives forecasting models in the 2018
elections. In creating open-source implementations of these
models, we outline key underlying assumptions. We find that
although the results were unsurprising, they indicate a weak-
ening of many traditional forecasting indicators.
Introduction
The results of the United States 2018 midterm elections are
in, and with only one race left uncalled three weeks after
election day, the Democrats have gained 39 or 40 seats in
the House of Representatives. Although this outcome—the
so-called “blue wave”—is consistent with most predictions
leading up to the election, the individual forecasting indi-
cators pointed in wildly different directions as November 6
approached.
Fivethirtyeight’s final prediction of a net pickup of 39
seats ended up being right on target (Silver 2018). The
Economist predicted a net change of 36 seats (Economist
2018). By synthesizing all of the indicators, they made ro-
bust predictions that held up to reality. Academic models, on
the other hand, varied much more wildly in their predictions,
from a predicted change of 27 seats to a predicted change of
44 seats.
In the October 2014 issue of PS: Political Science and
Politics, five teams presented forecasts for the U.S. House of
Representatives midterm elections. Four of these forecasts
were accurate to within four seats, and the last was off by
nine (Campbell et al. 2015). One team noted that, given the
uncertainty associated with their prediction, to have gotten
a result so close to their forecast required some degree of
“luck” (Campbell et al. 2015).
Two years later, the recap of the 2016 forecasts wasn’t
as celebratory (Campbell et al. 2017). Forecasts predicted
Democratic gains in the house that never materialized. How-
ever, predictions were not wildly off; many predicted the
Presidential national vote with high precision, and house
predictions were mostly within standard prediction errors.
The error was consistent across the forecasts, with predic-
tions favorable to the Democrats, which might have acci-
dentally conveyed a confidence in these results that didn’t
exist in any of the models individually.
In 2018, the various tools used to make predictions were
pointing in different directions, some towards a modest
Democratic gain and some towards a huge blue wave. Four
of the models presented in the October 2014 issue of PS
appeared again in the 2018 issue. We created an open-
source implementation of each of these models in advance
of their publication, to examine the underlying assumptions
that might cause some of them to perform better than others.
Our replications of these models were extremely consis-
tent with the results published in October (See Table 1). It is
a good sign for the validity of these models that they can be
independently reproduced to a great deal of accuracy. The
notable exception is the Seat-in-Trouble model, which had a
significant change in methodology for the 2018 election.
In this paper we examine the stated and unstated assump-
tions of each model. We note that the parsimonious mod-
els based on historical precedent under-explained the blue
wave, indicating that either 2018 was an exception, or that
the effect of these national conditions are changing.
Background
Midterm election models largely fall into three camps:
Synthesizers, Structuralists, and Experts (Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2014). Synthesizers are the most common, or
at least the most pervasive to nonacademics: they com-
bine structural knowledge with polling data to provide con-
stantly shifting predictions that swing with the daily polls.
This is what Fivethirtyeight (Silver 2018), the Economist
(Economist 2018), and other popular websites are doing.
However, a forecast produced on the day before the elec-
tion is worth little compared to one produced months in ad-
vance. An early enough forecast can help election stakehold-
ers make decisions about campaign strategies and the allo-
cation of resources. Academic literature has shown that it is
possible to make a prediction long in advance (Gelman and
Azari 2017).
Synthesizing models promote obsession with the daily
swings of polls, which, although exciting, ultimately do not
have much effect on the outcome. Further, the volume of
predictions produced can pose a problem to a casual ob-
server: for example, consider that close to election day the
probability of some outcome remains steady at 80%. A ca-
sual observer could be tempted to believe that those daily
probabilities reinforce each other, and round up that value,
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Model Reproduced Predicted Seat Change Published Predicted Seat Change
Generic Ballot -32 -30
National Polls District Info -28 -27
Seats-in-Trouble -68 -44
Structure-X. -43 -44
Table 1: Predicted House seat change for Republican party in reproduced and official forecasts. Actual result is expected to be
-39 or -40 based on California’s 21st district.
believing the outcome to be more certain than just 80%. In
truth, those predictions are highly correlated, and the out-
come is hardly certain.
Finally, although Fivethirtyeight promotes explanations
of the underlying math in their model, how they chose their
parameters and the model’s exact workings remain a black
box for proprietary reasons. Conversely, the advantage of
academic predictions is that they can be replicated and aug-
mented, making projects like this one possible.
The second camp of forecasters, structuralists, try to pre-
dict using situational factors that are rooted in political the-
ory (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2014). For example, if the
economy is doing poorly, forecasters would expect voters to
swing away from the party currently in control of the gov-
ernment. Structuralists use data like economic performance
in their forecasts.
All of the forecasts we will be examining use post-World
War II election data to make their predictions, defining the
elections in this time period to be modern elections on which
we can regress to make conclusions about today. This makes
2018 the 19th modern midterm election. With so few data
points, it would be easy to believe there are trends where
there is only coincidence, overfitting a model to the data
from previous elections. Thus predictors need to be rooted in
theory, and parsimony is highly valued. In that way, election
forecasts serve a dual purpose: not only to make predictions
about the future, but to reinforce or undermine political the-
ories about what causes a party to gain or lose influence.
This is especially important this election, where different
predictors were pointing towards different outcomes, so the
ultimate result can speak to the relative importance of these
predictors.
The disadvantage of such models is that they rest on the
underlying assumptions of linear regression; they assume
that the effect of each national condition on voting patterns
has remained constant since World War II. Any deviation
from these standards would result in a poorly-predicted elec-
tion.
The final camp, known as experts, use expert opinions
months in advance to predict election results. Organiza-
tions like Cook Political Report produce seat ratings in the
months before elections, rating individual races as “Safe”,
“Likely”, or “Leaning” towards a particular party, or “Toss-
up” (Cook 2018). These ratings tend to be well-correlated
with the probability that a seat flips (Campbell 2018), so ex-
perts make predictions based on these ratings. These have
historically been extremely accurate, but in 2016 they per-
formed notably poorly.
We will discuss the four forecasts published in both the
Figure 1: House seat probability distribution from re-
constructed Generic Ballot Model. Blue fill indicates
a Democratic-controlled House, while red indicates a
Republican-controlled House.
2014 October issue and 2018 October issue of PS: Political
Science and Politics.
Forecasts
Generic Ballot Model
Professor Alan Abramowitz proposes a simple structural-
ist model for house and senate prediction. To predict the
net change in Republican-held seats in a midterm election
year, we need three pieces of information: which party cur-
rently holds the Presidency, the generic ballot margin in
early September, and the number of seats Republicans cur-
rently hold (Abramowitz 2018).
Each one of these predictors is heavily rooted in theory.
The party which holds the Presidency tends to lose seats
during the midterms. In fact, 1998 and 2002 were the only
midterm election years since World War II where the incum-
bent party did not lose seats in the House. In addition, parties
that hold more seats will tend to lose more; this is called an
exposure model (Campbell 2014).
The generic ballot margin refers to the net approval of
Republicans in so-called generic ballot polls, national polls
in which registered or likely voters are asked if they will vote
for the Democrat or Republican in their district. This margin
is clearly a reflection of voter sentiment, and is pertinent to
how voters will act in November.
The primary problem with the reproduction of this
model is the consistency of generic ballot data. One of
Abramowitz’s predictors is the generic ballot margin in early
September. We interpreted this to mean the average margin
in polls taken 60 to 90 days before the election, because
the exact timeframe is not specified. In many of the ear-
lier elections being regressed on, this value reflects a sin-
gle poll, usually by Gallup. In recent years, polling has pro-
liferated massively. Reuters/Ipsos releases a new poll every
day. We follow the methodology of Professors Bafumi, Erik-
son and Wlezien and include only live polls, including those
taken over the telephone by real people (Bafumi, Erikson,
and Wlezien 2014). This is not because we believe live polls
to be more accurate than robotic polls. Rather, this is an at-
tempt to maximize consistency across the elections being re-
gressed on. Thus we exclude polls taken online, robotically,
or by IVR (Interactive Voice Response).
However, this poses an existential threat to forecasting
models that try to use historical polling data: technology is
changing, as is the way we interact with it. The assump-
tion that the relationship between polling results and voter
sentiment has remained constant over these technological
changes through the past 70 years is hard to defend and even
harder to prove.
Ultimately, we produce a forecast that differs from
Abramowitz’s by 2 seats, a difference that can most likely
be attributed to the use of different polling data.
This model ultimately under-predicted the Democratic
gains in 2018, indicating the fervor of Democratic voters
was not fully captured by the generic ballot polling results.
National Polls and District Info Model
Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien propose a structuralist model
for forecasting US house midterm elections based on data
available by early July (Bafumi, Erikson, and Wlezien
2018). The first step in the NPDI model is to predict the na-
tional house vote for the upcoming midterm election. This is
done using only two predictor variables: the party of the cur-
rent president, and the average Democratic share of generic
ballot results between 180 and 121 days before the election.
The response variance in their linear regression is the
Democratic share of the two-party national House vote,
measured in percentage points away from 50. However, in
their model they do not force the intercept to 0. The empir-
ical intercept value of -0.14 reflects a belief that indepen-
dent of other factors, Democrats will outperform Republi-
cans. There isn’t any theory to defend this, only the data, and
concerns about overfitting indicate we might want to remove
this term. Thus in the replication of the model, we force the
intercept to 0.
Bafumi et al. predict Democrats to win 53.6% of the na-
tional house vote, which matches our model’s replication of
53.5%. At this time, the true Democratic two-party share of
the national house vote is 54.0%.
Another important question to address at this point is why
we care about the national vote. Ultimately, we are interested
in the swing of national House vote from 2016 to 2018. In
Figure 2: Results from 10,000 simulations of reconstructed
National Poll District Info Model.
order to model the covariance of House races, Bafumi et al
simulate the election by first picking a value for the national
swing using a prediction interval from their linear model.
They then assume that on average, districts move uniformly
to the left by that swing, and simulate uncertainty in each
race’s result.
This is done repeatedly, simulating thousands of elections.
The proportion of these elections in which a certain event
occurs is taken to be the probability of that event occurring.
There are a few things to unpack here. In truth, we are not
interested in the swing of the national House vote. We are in-
terested in the mean swing in contested districts. If we knew
that value, then the shift of all contested races by that amount
would create an unbiased estimator for the actual results.
But when a district is uncontested, it puts bias on the na-
tional House vote that does not reflect the change in national
conditions. This is particularly exacerbated by top-two pri-
mary states like California, where some races don’t include
a single Republican. An increase in uncontested races will
therefore be disproportionately represented in the national
vote percentage.
In addition, the total swing in contested districts and the
mean swing in contested districts are not the same. For ex-
ample, if there is a negative correlation between percentage
Democratic vote in a district and the total number of peo-
ple that vote, we would expect that summing all the votes in
those districts and calculating percentage Democratic vote
would look worse for Democrats than just taking the mean
Democratic share across those districts, because the latter
weighs all districts evenly. Thus if one party’s turnout is
dampened or increased more than the other party’s from
2016 to 2018, that introduces bias into the model.
In their 2014 model, Bafumi et al argue that in midterm
election years Democrats are particularly bad at turnout and
the Democratic mean district advantage grows in size (Ba-
fumi, Erikson, and Wlezien 2014). However, after observing
the results of the 2014 election, they found this effect to be
not as consistent as they proposed in 2014, and abandoned
that adjustment in their 2018 model.
How to take into account the discrepancy between na-
tional vote and mean competitive district vote remains an
open problem. However, we independently came to the same
conclusion, and simply used national vote as a proxy for
mean competitive district vote, as there is not enough reason
to believe that prediction would be more likely to be wrong
in one direction than another.
Finally, the mean swing is used to predict each individual
race based on how it behaved in 2016. Bafumi et al propose
only dividing races up into those with incumbents and those
with open seats. Any race that was uncontested in the previ-
ous election is conceded immediately. This will rarely pose
a problem, because it is unlikely a seat will go from uncon-
tested to competitive in 2 years.
However, this does pose a potential danger, because that
does happen. For example, PA-18 was not contested by
Democrats in 2016, but Democrats actually won it in the
early 2018 special election, although due to redistricting that
district no longer exists. It happened again on November 6
when TX-32 was won by Democrats despite not fielding a
candidate in 2016.
The uncertainty in incumbent races is found to be smaller
than in open seats, which matches our expectation. Fresh-
man surge, the gaining of incumbency advantage for a fresh-
man representative, is further calculated and included in the
model.
In this model, we are predicting how districts behave
based on how they have behaved in 2016. However, the
question of what that even means is non-trivial. For incum-
bent races, do we use how they voted for representative, or
how they voted for president? In open races, we only use
presidential performance, because the candidate voted on in
2016 and 2018 are different. But in incumbent races, we
want to use both. Because these values are hugely collinear,
the relative power of these predictors is difficult to calculate
from the data.
Further, this is a political question. In the lead-up to the
2018 election, a big question in the air was: is the GOP the
party of Trump? Will Republicans perform better in districts
they historically perform well in, or in the ones specifically
Trump performed well in?
Despite a number of simplifications, we predicted the Re-
publicans would lose 28 seats, while Bafumi et al. predict
they would lose 27. This is a dramatic underestimate of the
real results, which starkly contrasts with the accuracy of the
national vote share.
What can we learn from the fact that the model accu-
rately predicted the national vote, but not the seat swings?
Plenty of districts swung more to the left than Bafumi et
al. predicted, but elsewhere there must have been more Re-
publican votes to compensate. The easiest explanation for
this discrepancy is that the model of uniform district swing
didn’t hold: some demographics, either racial, gender, edu-
cation level, or geographic, swung more to the left than aver-
age, handing more districts to the Democrats than Bafumi et
al. expected. Other demographics, to compensate, must have
swung left.
Structure-X Model
Michael Lewis-Beck and Charles Tien mix a structural
model and an expert model to produce their forecast, giv-
ing it its name: Structure-X (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2018).
Figure 3: House seat probability distribution from recon-
structed Structure-X Model.
In this model, the change in incumbent party seats is pre-
dicted by three variables: the percent change in Real Dispos-
able Income (RDI) in the first two quarters of the election
year, the approval rating of the President in June of the elec-
tion year, and whether or not it is a midterm election. Each
of these predictors is rooted in theory and points in the direc-
tion we’d expect: good economic growth is associated with
pro-incumbent sentiment, as does Presidential approval. In-
cumbents tend to lose seats during midterm years, having
done so in every election since 1948 other than 1998 and
2002, the latter being an exceptional case as the election im-
mediately followed 9/11.
Although it makes sense that presidential approval pre-
dicts midterm results, it would also make sense to claim
presidential disapproval is a good predictor. These two are
highly correlated, and result in almost identical R2 values.
In this election, the choice of which to use makes little differ-
ence. Predicting using disapproval results in an extra swing
of 1 seat towards Democrats.
Using only these structural cues gives an estimated Re-
publican loss of 28 seats in our replication, and 30 seats in
Lewis-Beck and Tien’s.
This model doesn’t take into account the current dis-
tribution of seats, which is highly correlated with the re-
sulting seat change. To close this predictive gap, Lewis-
Beck and Tien take the average of their prediction and
Rothenburg’s Seats-in-Play differential (Lewis-Beck and
Tien 2014). Rothenburg synthesizes predictive factors to
rate individual races as “Safe”, “Likely”, or “Leaning” to-
wards a particular party, or “Toss-up”. For the 2018 election,
Rothenburg has been succeeded by Inside Elections (Gonza-
les 2018).
Why an average of these two values? Should one be
weighted more than another? The problem with questions
like these is that Rothenburg has only been producing fore-
casts since 2006, so any attempt to regress on how to com-
bine these two predictors on only 6 data points will yield
noisy results. Thus we follow the simple methodology of an
equally weighted average. This yields good predictions for
the past few elections, but with so few data points, it’s hard
to know if this is a coincidence. More elections might re-
veal that a differently weighted average will provide better
Figure 4: House seat probability distribution from recon-
structed Seats-in-Trouble Model.
results.
It is worth noting that the structural half of this model
underestimated Democratic gains and Expert models over-
estimated them, but together they produced a slight overes-
timate.
Seats-in-Trouble Model
The Seats-in-Trouble model is an simple model built on a
single predictor (Campbell 2018). Using the paradigm of an
exposure model introduced above, this model uses data from
Cook Political Report’s seat ratings to predict election re-
sults. The idea behind this model is that a party with more
seats considered “in trouble” will lose more seats, on aver-
age. However, in 2016 and before, “in trouble” was defined
to mean the number of seats a party controls that are rated as
leaning towards them or worse (Campbell 2014). The num-
ber of Democratic seats in play minus the number of Repub-
lican seats in play, called the net seats in play, is the only
predictor for this model.
One large disadvantage for this model is that we don’t
understand what is motivating the predictions, because Cook
does not publish their methodology. This model is purely
predictive.
Using this methodology, we would predict a net change
of seats of 68 towards Democrats, a massive wave. In truth,
expert models predicted the 63-seat wave of 2014 better than
any other type of models (Lewis-Beck and Tien 2014). One
concern, however, is that in this election, there are twice as
many “lean Republican”s than “lean Democrats”s. Thus by
reducing the distribution across multiple categories into a
single predictor we lose information, and we might expect
the real result to be to the right of this prediction.
Campbell argues that after the poor performance of the
model in 2016, he re-evaluated, and redefined “in trouble”
to mean toss-up or worse. The failure of the model in 2016
can also be attributed, however, to experts predicting much
better Democratic performance than materialized.
Considering the breadth of factors that likely go into the
expert predictions, it is concerning to consider two interpre-
tations of the data, especially if the interpretation is cho-
sen after seeing the data. Without enough solid reasoning
to choose one model over another except for a difference in
R2 of 0.05 on such a small dataset, the choice is arbitrary.
Both interpretations of the data overestimated the seat
change, albeit ours much more drastically than Campbell’s.
Conclusions
After the 2016 election, there was concern about the relia-
bility of polls (Campbell et al. 2017). However, in 2018 na-
tional factors such as the performance of the economy and
presidential approval ratings universally underestimated the
size of the blue wave. The district-to-district polls and spe-
cial election results pointed towards a massive wave.
These results informed expert prognosticators which in
turn informed expert models. These models overestimated
Democratic gains. The structural models, on the other hand,
underestimated Democratic gains. Thus the problem lies not
in polling specifically, but in the danger of ascribing too
much confidence to any one indicator. Taken altogether, they
produce a robust forecast.
The underlying mechanisms of these models raise ques-
tions about the validity of linear regression in this setting.
As technology changes, the relationship between polling re-
sults and voter sentiment might be changing as well. Further,
the universal underperformance of fundamentals in predict-
ing this election points to their power potentially weakening.
Despite Trump being only moderately unpopular according
to approval and disapproval ratings, and despite the excel-
lent performance of the economy, Republicans lost dozens
of seats November 6. The circumstances that inform voter
preferences change over time, and it is important we build
models to reflect these changes.
Reproducibility
All of the code for these models can be found at
github.com/hbendekgey/house forecast 2018. The models
can be further examined and adjusted at
https://midterms.shinyapps.io/2018/. Finally, the codebase
of that website can further be found at
github.com/hbendekgey/midterms-website
Missing from this codebase is generic ballot polls, which
were kindly shared to me by Professors Bafumi, Erikson,
and Wlezien. 2018 polls can be found in Fivethirtyeight’s
Github.
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